To Franklin Pierce

War Department, December 1, 1856.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the army for the past year, and to lay before you the reports of the several bureaus of the War Department, and communications from other officers of the army.

The authorized strength of the army, as now posted, is 17,894. The actual strength at the date of the consolidation of the returns, July 1, 1856, was 15,562. The number of enlistments made during the twelve months ending September 30, 1856, was 4,440. The number of persons offering to enlist, but who were refused on account of minority and unfitness for service, was 5,594. The number of casualties in the army, by deaths, discharges, and desertions, during the year ending June 30, 1856, was 6,090; of which 3,223 were by desertion.

The accompanying tables exhibit the distribution of the troops in several military departments. During the past year the department of the Pacific has been reinforced by three companies of the 1st dragoons and the 9th regiment of infantry. A post has been established at Tucson, New Mexico, for the protection of the valley of the Santa Cruz, and the restraint of the Indians north of the Gila, and is at present garrisoned by four companies of the 1st dragoons. The regiment of mounted riflemen, in consequence of threatened hostilities with the Navajo Indians in New Mexico, was ordered, in June last, to that department from Texas. Two companies of the 2d dragoons and the 2d regiment of infantry occupy the posts located on the Upper Missouri at the close of the late campaign against the Sioux Indians.

An expedition has been sent to the northern boundary of Minnesota Territory for the purpose of acquiring information respecting that region of country and the Indians residing there, upon whom it was supposed the appearance of a body of troops among them would exercise a beneficial influence. The knowledge thus gained will determine the most eligible site for a military post in that quarter, should it hereafter be deemed advisable to establish one.

The Indian difficulties of the western plains have been successfully terminated, except those with the Cheyennes.

The troops designated and held in readiness during the past summer, for campaign against them, it was hoped and believed would not only have reduced that particular tribe to good order, but would have sufficed to insure as much of peace and security to transient persons over all the plains north of Red river and west of the Missouri as is compatible with the continuance there of wandering uncivilized tribes.

In Texas, though the amount of military force has been reduced within the past year, we have had reason to congratulate ourselves upon less frequent disturbances than have existed for some years past; but owing to the fact that the State of Texas owns all the land, with the exception of the two small reservations recently made, the Indians of that State are without any permanent home; and the control which can be exercised over them, under those circumstances, can never be sufficient either to give security to the whites, or in any material degree to ameliorate the condition of the Indians. Could the fragmentary tribes in Texas be removed to lands owned by the United States north of the Red river, a great reduction would be made in the expenditures now required in Texas for the maintenance of many military posts, which would then become wholly useless, whilst a great service would be rendered to the development of the resources of that State; and surely better prospects would be offered for the improvement of the Indian tribes.

The Indians within the limits of the department of New Mexico have generally observed their treaty stipulations. Occasional depredations have been committed by them, but none, it is believed, of a serious nature, or indicating any settled hostility on their part.

The Indian hostilities existing in Oregon and Washington Territories at the date of the last annual report from this department, which threatened to be of a very formidable character, have been generally suppressed. A combination embracing most of the tribes inhabiting those Territories was entered into, and the extermination of the whites seemed to be their purpose; but the military expeditions sent against them have been conducted with much energy, and have been so far successful that, with a few exceptions, their hostile demonstrations have ceased. The disturbances on Puget’s Sound and in the Rogue River valley are reported as terminated; and it is hoped that the tribes in and about Walla-Walla valley, between whom and the troops a collision recently took place, will speedily be brought to terms.

Military positions have been occupied in the country recently in possession of the Indians, and judicious movements of the troops will, it is believed, prevent any outbreak of a general nature hereafter.

Much information respecting the origin and progress of this war was communicated to Congress at its last session, and published in Senate Documents Nos. 26 and 66, and House Documents Nos. 93 and 118. The reports of subsequent events contain full information respecting the transactions.

The possessory rights secured to the Hudson’s Bay and Puget’s Sound companies leave, in this portion of our Territory, traders and others who possess great influence over the Indian tribes, but owe no allegiance to the United States. It will be readily perceived that preceding and during hostilities such persons cannot be expected to pursue any other course than that which would preserve to them the trade and good will of the Indians, and therefore, that their presence cannot be otherwise than detrimental to the control of the United States over those tribes. In this connexion, it may not be inappropriate to suggest the propriety of speedily extinguishing such possessory rights.

I regret to state that the efforts of the department have thus far proved unavailing to effect the removal of the Seminole Indians remaining in the peninsula of Florida to the new home provided for them west of the Mississippi river. These Indians have within the past year given repeated evidence of their hostility, and the department has made the necessary arrangements to carry on a vigorous campaign against them during the present season. As large a force as the demands of the service in other quarters will permit has been concentrated in Florida for this purpose, consisting of four companies of the 1st artillery, ten companies of the 4th artillery, the 5th regiment of infantry, and a limited number of volunteer militia, all under the command of Brevet Brigadier General Harney.

The expense and embarrassment to the military service resulting from the present policy of locating posts in advance of settlement, and along emigrant routes across the continent, continue to be seriously felt. It is manifested in the large amounts required for transportation, and in the small garrisons found at most of the posts.

A policy adopted to subserve the purposes of a given case suggests a revision with every material change of circumstances. When from the communities originally established along the Atlantic slope of the United States industrial emigrants went forth to penetrate the wilderness of the Mississippi valley, they found on every hand a fertility which invited to agricultural labor, and each settlement soon became productive of all the necessaries of life. Military posts advanced with the progress of the pioneer, and whilst the one afforded protection, the labor of the other soon furnished the supplies required for subsistence. The general fund of the United States was indemnified for expenditures to support these advanced military posts by the results which followed from the appropriation and cultivation of its wild domain. If we have now passed the limit of general fertility, and pushed our military posts into a region where they can never be surrounded by an agricultural producing population, then the circumstances have so materially changed as to call for a revision of the policy which was founded upon a different condition of things, and connected with results which are no longer attainable. The reports of reconnaissance submitted by the War Department within the last two years have given such general and detailed accounts of the character of the country between the Mississippi river and the Pacific ocean as to render here unnecessary its further geographical description. Those reports sufficiently show that, with few exceptions, the country lying between the one hundredth meridian of longitude and the coast-range of mountains overlooking the Pacific ocean, is not susceptible of cultivation without the aid of artificial means, and that the country can probably never be covered by agricultural settlements. A limit has, therefore, been reached, beyond which civilization has ceased to follow in the train of advancing military posts, and the service and support of the military peace establishment is essentially altered. A new post, established in the desert region to which I have referred, does not become the nucleus of a settlement from which, in a short time, the provisions and forage can be drawn, and the expense for transportation thus reduced to the necessary supply of clothing, groceries, implements, and munitions, but all the heavy articles of subsistence must be procured at a remote market and transported to such frontier posts. Nor is this the only difference; for to this increased amount of transportation is also to be added the difference between the expense of transporting along navigable rivers or over roads through continuous settlements, and that of passing through a desert region where no supplies or assistance are to be obtained, and no roads to be found except those built by the United States, the combustible structures of which are at all times liable to be destroyed by the nomadic tribes who inhabit the country. Without entering more minutely into detail, it will be seen why the cost of transportation has increased so greatly within a few years past, and why efforts, by rigid economy, to reduce the general expense for the army, must prove unavailing until the character of the service required of it has been radically modified. The views presented in relation to the inutility of military posts in this desert region, as connected with the development of the resources of the country, have been expanded in their application by the military reconnaissance referred to, but do not rest upon that species of evidence alone.

The settlement of the Territory of New Mexico was begun long anterior to that of a large portion of the populous districts of the United States, yet to this day cultivation has extended but very little beyond the narrow valleys of the Rio Bravo and the Santa Cruz; and though Forts Laramie and Kearny, on the Oregon route, were established more than eight years since, no agricultural settlements have grown up around either, and thus are the conclusions drawn from the reports of reconnoitering parties as to the general character of the country satisfactorily confirmed. Though we have been in the habit of believing that the great basin of the Territory of Utah presented a fertile oasis, recent events have furnished much reason for doubt as to its capability to sustain any considerable population depending from year to year on the agricultural products which each year’s cultivation affords. Assuming, then, that the limits of the fertile regions have been sufficiently well ascertained, and that future operations should be made to conform to the character of the country, the true interests of the public service would seem to suggest important modifications of the policy which heretofore directed the employment of the military force. Instead of dispersing the troops to form small garrisons at numerous posts where they exhibit only weakness to a savage foe, it is suggested that within the fertile regions a few points accessible by steamboats or by railways should be selected, at which large garrisons should be maintained, and from which strong detachments should annually be sent out into the Indian country during the season when the grass will suffice for the support of cavalry horses, and beasts of draught and burden. These detachments would be available both to hunt up and chastise those tribes who had committed depredations, and by passing alone the main routes to California, and Oregon and Washington Territories, would give the needful protection to emigrants during the season of their transit. Experience has shown that small posts are nearly powerless beyond their own limits. Some of the most flagrant depredations have been committed on parties in the vicinity of such military posts, and their inability to pursue and punish the offenders has tended to bring into disrepute the power and energy of the United States, whose citizens were the victims of predatory attacks. Indeed, it is quite supposable that these posts, being fixed points in the route of emigrants, afford the Indians the opportunity of observing each train which passes, and thus enable them to determine upon future operations.

Cavalry cannot be sustained in a state of efficiency unless provided during the winter with stables, grain and hay. At some of the remote posts even the material for construction must be transported a great distance, and the forage can only be furnished at prices which extreme necessity alone will justify. For example: corn delivered at Ford Laramie costs about five dollars a bushel. Infantry garrisons are less expensive, because less forage is required; but, under such circumstances, neither can be sustained except at great cost.

It may be proper further to consider the comparative value of troops thus distributed, and of those serving by detachments from large garrisons quartered in eligible positions. If sufficient garrisons were kept at all the posts now established for the purpose of making expeditions at any time from them among the neighboring tribes, which would require a very considerable augmentation of the present military establishment and a commensurate increase of appropriations for its support, it is not believed that they would be equally effective with marching detachments of the same numerical strength. Their position would be known, their preparations for taking the field would be observed, and a considerable force would necessarily be left behind for the protection of the public property at each military post. The instruction and discipline in quarters would be inferior to that of large garrisons, and the capacity of the troops suddenly emerging from quarters to begin the forced marches of pursuit would be less than that of men inured by a long march and frequent bivouacs to bear fatigue and protect themselves against exposures incident to service in the field. The policy of distribution as at present pursued also involves the frequent construction and abandonment of posts, and with such garrisons as we may expect to have with the present or probable size of the army, involves the employment of all the troops for long periods at constant labor, alike injurious to military instruction and the contentment of the soldier. His compensation at such times is far inferior to that of the common laborer on the frontier, and the prospect of abandoning the position soon after he has made it comparatively comfortable leaves him without an adequate inducement for the sacrifice he is called on to make. A laborer without pay or promise of improvement in his condition, a soldier without the forms and excitement of military life, it is hardly to be wondered at that this state of things should lead to desertion, which has become so frequent as to be one of the great evils of the service. Under the other policy which has been suggested, the troops would be comfortably quartered in the midst of civilization, their summer campaigns would be the field practice of their profession, the temporary dangers and toils of which give zest to a soldier’s life; and if to these be added the prospect of a return to the comforts, associations, and means of instruction of a large garrison at a well-established post, it is not seen why the service could not be rendered attractive to persons of military spirit, and it is believed that the efficiency of the troops would be increased proportionally as the expense of supporting them would be diminished.

The occupation of Algeria by the French presents a case having much parallelism to that of our western frontier, and affords us the opportunity of profiting by their experience. Their practice, as far as understood by me, is to leave the desert region to the possession of the nomadic tribes; their outposts, having strong garrisons, are established near the limits of the cultivated region, and their services performed by large detachments making expeditions into the desert regions as required. The marching columns being sufficiently strong to inflict punishment wherever it is deserved, have inspired, it is said, the native tribes with such respect for their power that it has seldom been found necessary to chastise any tribe a second time.

As our present policy rests upon various acts of legislation and the concurrent views of several preceding administrations, a change as radical as that which is here suggested should receive critical examination, and, perhaps, require legislative action before being adopted. The department, if left to the free exercise of its judgment, would have abandoned the policy at present followed, by adopting a few eligible positions, easy of access, and in the midst of a region so productive as to sustain large settlements, from which the bulk of the supplies of the garrisons could be drawn.

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